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Confronting the Privatization and
Commercialization of Academic Research:
An Analysis of Social Implications at the
Local, National, and Global Levels
RISA L. LIEBERWITZ*
INTRODUCTION
In the current era of capitalist hegemony, the term "globalization" has be-
come synonymous with the global dominance of private market economies.
Though concepts of "internationalism" have long been associated with the politi-
cal Left, the possibilities of a progressive vision ofglobalization are currently over-
shadowed by the deepening of private market policies in existing capitalist
economies and the expansion of capitalism to former socialist countries and to de-
veloping countries throughout the world. This phenomenon has affected all soci-
etal institutions through governmental implementation of privatization policies
and deregulation; through the power of global financial institutions-such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund-to impose loan conditions
that require governments to adopt policies that promote private markets;' and
through multilateral trade agreements that favor transnational corporations
(TNCs) in their pursuit of increased capital mobility and market expansion
This article addresses the impact of privatization on universities in the
United States, focusing, in particular, on the effects on the university mission
and academic research in the life sciences. Both public and private nonprofit
universities have been affected by public policies of privatization, leading to
*Associate Professor of Labor Law, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell Univer-
sity; associated faculty, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1976, University of Florida; J.D. 1979, Univer-
sity of Florida. I would like to thank my colleague, Alfred C. Aman, Jr. for inviting me to
participate in the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Symposium on Globalization and Educa-
tion. I would also like to thank the participants at that conference for their insightful comments
on my presentation, which formed the basis for this article.
1. See, e.g., Guy Brucculeri, A Need to Refocus the Mandate of the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, 17 W.R.L.S.I. 53, 70-73 (2004). See generally Eugenia McGill, Poverty and So-
cial Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More Coherent Approach?, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 371,
371-84 (2004).
2. See infra notes 165-94 and accompanying text.
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increased commercialization of academic research and growing university-
industry ties. These changes in practices have been accompanied by a significant
weakening of the traditional definition of the university mission of serving the
public interest through university teaching and research independent from con-
flicting interests of either government or business. Tied closely to university in-
dependence has been the core value of faculty academic freedom, protecting
faculty autonomy over their work and enabling them to ensure the integrity of
teaching and research that is independent from conflicting interests.3
The university's mission and the rights of faculty also describe the social role
of the university and its faculty. Where the university has a public mission, its so-
cial role is defined in terms of promoting the public interest.4 Its policies and
practices should, therefore, be aimed toward carrying out its public mission. As
the university's mission becomes privatized, however, its social role is redefined
as well, shifting from the public interest to serving private economic interests.
Given the dominant influence of the United States in promoting private market
economies globally, the social implications of privatizing the university's mission
will extend beyond the national borders as well.
This article begins with a discussion of the traditional definition of the uni-
versity's public mission and faculty academic freedom, which have formed the
core elements of faculty identity in the university. In part 1I, the discussion moves
to legal developments promoting privatization that have had a major impact on
these traditional definitions of university mission and faculty rights. The relevant
legal developments have taken place at both the national and international levels.
At the national level, these changes have been aimed specifically at the university,
with the federal Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,' which authorizes and encourages federal
fund recipients-including universities-to patent and license federally funded
research. As a consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities have expanded
their private market activities, leading to a major growth in university-owned
patents and licensing of patents to industry. The article explores the impact of in-
creased market activities at three levels: at the local level, on university culture and
3. See infra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
4. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, available at http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/
1940stat.htm#backla ("Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The com-
mon good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.").
5. See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2001).
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research; at the national level, on the university's public mission; and at the inter-
national level, on the social implications of the university's involvement with ex-
panding intellectual property rights. The article examines the international
consequences of this commercialization by examining the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) multilateral trade agreement known as TRIPS-the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.6 The 1994 TRIPS
agreement, which requires WTO signatories to enact national laws protecting in-
tellectual property rights, was not created with universities in mind. But with the
increase of university-industry exclusive licensing agreements, university intellec-
tual property practices take on global implications, as TNCs rely on TRIPS to
reap the global benefits of their monopoly over university-owned patents. Part III
of the article further explores the national and international social implications of
the privatization and commercialization of the university and the need for faculty
to recognize their role in either promoting or opposing these changes. This discus-
sion suggests some forms of individual and collective action that faculty can take
to reverse the privatization practices in the university and to reassert the univer-
sity's public mission.
I. FACULTY IDENTITY: DEFINING THE CONTENT AND
PROCESS OF ACADEMIC WORK
University faculty form their identity in relation to both the content of their
work and the process by which they carry out their work. In terms of content,
faculty identify strongly with their academic discipline and typically define their
work life in terms of three categories: teaching, research, and service.7 While the
content of their work might appear to be of primary importance, the work pro-
cess is at least as important to faculty identity. At the heart of the work process is
the core value of academic freedom, which provides faculty with autonomy over
their work. At the level of individual autonomy, academic freedom provides
6. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31,33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
7. See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS
CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 218 (2003); CORNELL UNIVERSITY FACULTY HANDBOOK 42
(2002), available at http://web.cornell.edu/UniversityFaculty/ ("The responsibilities of a faculty
member include teaching, research, and other scholarly achievement, public service, advising stu-
dents, and contributing to the department, the college, and the university.").
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each faculty member with control over teaching and research content and meth-
ods.' Individual faculty academic freedom also provides faculty members with
the right to express their views publicly about the university or about issues un-
related to the university, including political issues.9 Collective faculty academic
freedom provides faculty with autonomy to engage in self-governance of teach-
ing, research, and service. Through faculty service on departmental and univer-
sity committees, and through governance processes such as faculty senates and
unions, faculty exercise collective authority over issues such as curriculum, grad-
uation requirements, student admissions, as well as in judging the merit of col-
leagues' work in hiring and promotions processes.' Individual academic
freedom and collective academic freedom are often in harmony, particularly
where the collective autonomy of self-governance supports individual faculty
members' ability to pursue their teaching and research interests. These two as-
pects of academic freedom may be in tension, though, as the collective judgment
of the faculty may be at odds with the full exercise of individual academic free-
dom. The exercise of faculty self-governance can, itself, lead to violations of ac-
ademic freedom in cases where tenured faculty abuse their power by denying
tenure to a candidate on the basis of bias against the tenure candidate's politics or
research perspectives."
The faculty work process includes the creation of the work as well as the
sharing of the work with others through informal exchanges of research ideas
and results, and formal sharing of work through publication in books and jour-
nals. This process of sharing work has multiple functions that intertwine the
8. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 99
YALE L.J. 251, 273-76 (1989); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Corporatization of the University: Distance
Learning at the Cost of Academic Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 80-85 (2002); Walter P.
Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1265, 1276-81 (1988) (discussing the process of achieving university autonomy).
9. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 1275; see also Matthew W. Finkin, "A Higher Order of Liberty in
the Workplace": Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Vortex of Employment Practices and Law, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357, 372 (1990).
10. Lieberwitz, supra note 8, at 84-85.
11. See Chester Hartman, Uppity and Out, A Case Study in the Politics of Faculty Reappointments
(and the Limitations of Grievance Procedures), in How HARVARD RULES, REASON IN THE SERVICE OF
EMPIRE 287 (John Trumpbour ed., 1989) [hereinafter How HARVARD RULES]; Jamin B. Raskin,
Laying Down the Law, The Empire Strikes Back, in How HARVARD RULES, supra, at 341; Ellen
Schrecker, Academic Freedom: The Historical View, in REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS: PERSPEC-
TIVES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOMS IN THE 1980s, 25, 25-27 (Craig Kaplan & Ellen Schrecker eds., 1983)
[hereinafter REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS].
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content and the process of faculty work. First, broad dissemination of work ex-
pands access to knowledge in the public domain. 2 Openness of research meth-
ods and results enables others to test the validity of the research. 3 Sharing of
research also enables further faculty research to build on the scholarship of
others. 4 Additionally, collective self-governance in judging the merit of work in
promotion reviews depends on respect for a system of peer review.
15
From both a legal and sociological perspective, the most interesting aspect of
academic freedom is its strength as a deeply held professional norm rather than
as a legal right.'6 The United States Supreme Court did not recognize a First
Amendment right of academic freedom until 1967 in Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents.'7 The effectiveness of this constitutional right is restricted by the doctrine
of state action, which limits application of the right to faculty in public sector
universities. 8 Substantive interpretations of the First Amendment and aca-
demic freedom have further reduced the strength of a constitutional right of ac-
ademic freedom for faculty. First, the Supreme Court has diluted First
Amendment rights for public sector employees by applying a balancing test that
heavily favors governmental managerial interests over public employee free
12. Many authors have addressed the communal norms of academic science. See, e.g., BERNARD
BARBER, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1953); ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
(1973); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,
97 YALE L. J. 177,181-84 (1987); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 88-94 (1999-2000).
13. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 182; Rai,supra note 12, at 89-90.
14. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 183; Rai, supra note 12, at 90.
15. See Lieberwitz,supra note 8, at 84-85.
16. Seeid. at 81, 89-96.
17. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (striking down as vague and overbroad
under the First Amendment New York's Feinberg Law, which conditioned employment in pub-
lic education on taking loyalty oath and barred public employment of members of "subversive"
organizations). Keyishian was preceded by Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), in which
the concept of academic freedom was developed without explicitly adopting academic freedom as
a constitutional right. The Court held that the State violated due process by finding Sweezy, a
Marxist economist, in contempt for refusing to answer questions concerning his university lec-
tures and other questions concerning political association during a State investigation of public
employment of "subversive persons."
18. Metzger, supra note 8, at 1291. Private university faculty could raise constitutional claims
concerning actions taken against individual faculty or the university by legislatures or other gov-
ernment officials. Id. at 1291-92; see also David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual"
and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227,
300 (1990).
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speech interests. 9 This test, which is a substitute for traditional First Amend-
ment strict scrutiny, has been used by lower federal courts in public sector fac-
ulty academic freedom cases.2" Additionally, the lower courts have accorded
judicial deference to a university's institutional right of academic freedom to
manage the university, which may override faculty claims that the university ad-
ministration has violated faculty academic freedom.2 Thus, the university's in-
stitutional academic freedom against governmental interference has been
extended to strengthen the university's managerial control over faculty. As a re-
sult of these jurisdictional and substantive factors, the potential of academic
freedom as a legal right of faculty has been significantly weakened.
From where, then, does faculty academic freedom derive its power as a pro-
fessional norm? The answer lies in the history of faculty demands for the auton-
19. The Supreme Court initially created its balancing test in 1968 in Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968), and further developed it in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); and Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). The Court balances
the "interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. See Lieberwitz,supra note 8, at 90-92
(discussing the balancing test).
20. There are cases that deny First Amendment protection for speech that would fit within the
scope of professional academic freedom. See, e.g., Landrum v. E. Ky. Univ., 578 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.
Ky. 1984) (academic curriculum); Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160 (N.D.Ga. 1983) (administra-
tor's performance and denial of tenure),affd, 734 F2d 1480 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1086 (1984). There is a discussion of Landrum and Ballard in Matthew W. Finkin, Intramural
Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (1988). See also
Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding that an administrator's interest in
educational mandate outweighed plaintiffs right to decide academic curriculum); Bishop v.
Aronov, 926 F2d 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (deciding that a University's interest in teaching mission
outweighed professor's right to editorialize religious beliefs in the classroom). Several other articles
have also discussed Scallet and Bishop. See, e.g., Rachel E. Fugate, Choppy Waters are Forecast for
Academic Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 187, 205 (1998); Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom
in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say, Does that Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet
Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 61 (1993).
21. Alisa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory" of Academic Freedom: A
Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 930-37 (2001); Matthew
W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 Tx. L. REV. 817 (1983); Hiers, supra note 20,
at 17-19; Metzger, supra note 8, at 1310-19. There are discussions of the difficulties of litigating
constitutional academic freedom as an individual right, given the Supreme Court's description of
academic freedom in cases such as Keyishian as a protection of educational institutions from gov-
ernmental interference. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 8, at 298; Chang, supra, at 922; see also, Rabban,
supra note 18, at 280-82 (describing constitutional academic freedom as an "individual" and an
"institutional" right).
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omy and independence that comprise the core values of academic freedom.
Decades before the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional concept of aca-
demic freedom, faculty engaged in collective struggles for autonomy in their re-
search and teaching. The founding of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) in 1915 grew out of university dismissals of faculty in the so-
cial sciences, whose social critiques were at odds with the interests of industrialists
who were also financial donors to the universities.22 The AAUP's demands for ac-
ademic freedom were, therefore, grounded in the need for faculty autonomy and
independence from all third party interests, which include the university admin-
istration, government, and private donors.23 The AAUP based its rationale for
these demands on the essential nature of academic freedom to enable faculty to en-
gage in research and teaching that fulfill the institutional role of universities in so-
ciety. The AAUP 1915 Declaration of Principles24 and the AAUP 1940 Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure25 describe the values underlying
academic freedom, which remain the foundation for the current professional
norm of academic freedom. 26 These statements justify faculty academic freedom
in relation to the social role of the university, which has a mission to contribute to
the public good. 27 Academic freedom enables faculty to serve the public interest by
22. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM IN THE UNITED STATES 419,426-27,439 (1955); ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: Mc-
CARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES 14-17 (1986).
23. Byrne, supra note 8, at 273-76; Metzger, supra note 8, at 1276-81 (1988).
24. AAUP 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 155, 166-68 (Louis Joughin
ed., 1967) [hereinafter 1915 DECLARATION].
25. 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, reprinted in AAUP POL-
ICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (B. Robert Kreiser ed., 9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter 1940 STATEMENTI.
26. The 1940 Statement of Principles, which has been widely accepted by academic organiza-
tions and institutions, has been described as "adher[ing] to, adapt[ing, and strengthen[ing]" the
principles of the 1915 Declaration. 1915 DECLARATION, sUpra note 24, at 157. The 1915 Declaration
has been called "the single most important document relating to American academic freedom."
Byrne, supra note 8, at 276; and "the first comprehensive analysis of academic freedom in the
United States, [which] remains the foundation for the nonlegal understanding of academic free-
dom within the academic world." Rabban, supra note 18, at 232. For a discussion of the effective-
ness of the AAUP's 1940 Statement, which was based on the 1915 Declaration, in shaping the
norms and practices of the academic profession, see Matthew W. Finkin, Regulation by Agree-
ment:The Case of Private Higher Education, 65 IowA L. REV. 1119, 1150-55 (1980).
27. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 24, at 160 (describing the university's identity as a "public
trust"); 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 3 (describing the university's mission of contributing to
the "common good").
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engaging in teaching and research that meet the standards of their profession,
without concern for pleasing university administrators, government officials, or
private business donors.28 Thus, faculty autonomy and independence are neces-
sary elements for ensuring work of high quality and integrity that deserves the
public trust. The protection of lifetime tenure provides faculty with job security
needed to reinforce the right of academic freedom, insulating faculty from pres-
sures to conform their teaching and research to serve third party interests.
29
This understanding of the underlying justifications for academic freedom is
the antithesis of the stereotype of the university as an "ivory tower." Faculty au-
tonomy and independence are not justified as a means to alienate faculty from
society, but rather to enable faculty to fulfill a social role of contributing to the
public good through work that is disinterested in the sense that faculty do not
seek to serve third party interests. This independence is essential to uphold pub-
lic trust in the integrity of the research and to avoid any actual influence over the
research results.3" The "disinterested" researcher can certainly reach strong con-
clusions or provide pointed social critiques that are consistent with the positions
held by third parties. These conclusions and critiques are more deserving of
public trust owing to faculty academic freedom from the obligation to serve
third party interests in their research, whether those third parties are the univer-
sity administration, governmental agencies, or corporate donors.
Even with recent privatization trends in the university, faculty continue to
exercise a significant degree of autonomy and independence in their academic
research. Academic freedom has given individual faculty control over their re-
search agendas, enabling them to pursue research regardless of the benefits or
disadvantages to private or governmental interests. Peer review of publications
and the sharing of research in the public domain remain the standard practices
for promoting excellence of research, for contributing to the progress of the aca-
demic discipline, and for building individual faculty reputations in their fields.3
28. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 24, at 162.
29. See generally 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing the privileges of tenureship).
30. See Rai, supra note 12, at 91 n.67 (describing the value of "disinterestedness" in academic
science, as equating the researcher's interest with the public interest of expanding knowledge,
rather than serving a narrow personal interest.); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 183-84.
31. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, GOOD PRACTICE IN TENURE EVALUA-
TION: ADVICE FOR TENURED FACULTY, DEPARTMENT CHAIRS, AND ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATORS 18-
19 (2000), available at www.aaup.org/Com-a/resources.htm#articles (last visited Jan. 24, 2005);
Lisa Guernsey & Vincent Kiernan, Journals See the Internet as a Tool in the Peer-Review System,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Apr. 2,1999, at A29.
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In the sciences, which are the primary focus of this article, strongly held values
of "communalism" have long been the foundation of academic culture, reflect-
ing the belief that the quality of academic research content and process is based
not only on individual accomplishments, but also on openly sharing informa-
tion, ideas, and research results in the public domain.
32
II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO TRADITIONAL ACADEMIC VALUES
A. Privatization Policies in Law and Practice
The preceding description of academic freedom presents an ideal description
of faculty autonomy and independence. While providing important protections
and power to faculty, the reality of academic freedom exists within the context of
social, economic, and political conditions that lead to policies and practices that fall
short of the ideal of academic freedom.33 In part, academic freedom is compro-
mised by the very structure of universities, which rely on funding from both gov-
ernmental appropriations and from private contributions.34 Although institutional
and individual academic freedom should create a wall of separation of academic
work from funding sources, the fear of losing funding can place powerful pressures
on the university and faculty to please the funders.35 The origins of the AAUP
demonstrate the potential power of private corporate donors to pressure universi-
ties to serve their economic interests, as the scale of corporate donations grew from
thousands to millions of dollars during the industrialization period of the early
32. Rai,supra note 12, at 90 n.67 (describing the value of "disinterestedness" in academic science,
as equating the researcher's interest with the public interest of expanding knowledge, rather than
serving a narrow personal interest). See also Risa L. Lieberwitz, University Science Research Fund-
ing: Privatizing Policy and Practice, in SCIENCE AND THE UNIVERSITY (Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Paula
E. Stephan eds., University of Wisconsin Press, forthcoming). See generally BARBER, supra note 12
(describing the general work in the sociology of science); MERTON, supra note 12; Eisenberg, supra
note 12, at 181-84; Rai,supra note 12, at 88-94.
33. See, e.g., Milton Fisk, Academic Freedom in Class Society to THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DoM 5 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1972); Craig Kaplan, Introduction to REGULATING THE INTELLECTU-
ALS, supra note 11, at 1, 3; Lawrence S. Lifschultz, Could Karl Marx Teach Economics in the United
States?, in How HARVARD RULES, supra note 11, at 279; Bertell Olman, Academic Freedom in America
Today:A Marxist View, in REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS,SUpra note 11, at 45, 47; Frances Fox Piven,
Academic Freedom and PoliticalDissent, in REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS, supra note 11, at 17, 18-19.
34. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66
TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64, 1371-72 (1988).
35. Id. at 1372-76.
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twentieth century.36 In debates over its founding principles, a syndicalist faction of
the AAUP advocated that all universities should be supported solely by public
funds, with broad faculty governance that included faculty control over appoint-
ments of administrators and university officers.37 This proposal was defeated, how-
ever, with the AAUP opting for demands for academic freedom within the
existing system that provided significant decision-making power to university ad-
ministrators, who continued to seek large private corporate contributions. 38
Public funding of universities has the benefit of placing appropriations de-
cisions in an open, democratic process, in which the public interest is an explicit
goal. Even in this public context, of course, threats to academic freedom remain.
Deeply internalized and strongly institutionalized norms of academic freedom
are essential to enable universities and faculty to resist pressures from the politi-
cal process, including the influence of private corporations in political decisions,
the government's efforts to involve universities in secret military research, and
political attacks during periods such as the McCarthy era, when many universi-
ties succumbed to pressures to purge the Left from the faculty.39 While recogniz-
ing these realities, public funding has the advantage of providing a democratic
forum for debates and decision-making regarding the best way to serve the pub-
lic interest. This focus on the public interest is consistent with the public mission
of the university and the value of academic freedom.
Following World War II, federal funding became the primary support for ac-
ademic research, consistently providing universities with at least 60 to 70 percent
of research support since 1960."0 Public funding has maintained its importance for
36. See HOFSTADTER & METZGERSUpra note 22, at 413.
37. Id. at 473; see also SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 25-27; Byrne, supra note 8, at 278-79;
Metzger, supra note 8, at 1276-78.
38. Within this division of power, faculty self-governance over academic matters is limited by
the final authority of the administration. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 8, at 278-79; Metzger, supra
note 8, at 1276-78; Schrecker, supra note 11, at 25-27. See generally HOFSTADTER & METZGER, SUpra
note 22, at 473 (discussing a proposed plan for academic freedom).
39. See Howard Zinn, The Politics of History in the Era of the Cold War: Repression and Resistance,
in THE COLD WAR AND THE UNIVERSITY: TOWARD AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE POSTWAR
YEARS 35, 52-71 (1997).
40. E.g., MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 35-36 (1986);
Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 40. See also
Sheila Slaughter & Gary Rhoades, TheEmergence ofa Competitiveness Research and Development Pol-
icy Coalition and the Commercialization of Academic Science and Technology, 21 Sci. TECH. & HUM.
VALUES 303,327 (1996) (discussing the decline in funding from 1973, when 69% of university R&D
was federally funded, to 1993, when 56% of university R&D was supported by federal funds).
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university life sciences research, estimated at 70 to 80 percent of total funding."
Although the postwar concentration of federal funding was at least partly attrib-
utable to Congress' political motivation of competing with the Soviet Union, 42 the
system of federal funding grants has led to institutional structures that correspond
with values of academic freedom. Federal grants are awarded by federal agencies,
such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) or the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF), on the basis of peer review processes.43 Although a federal agency can
shape research agendas through its descriptions of research interests and grants
awarded, the peer review process and the public interest mission are important for
limiting arbitrary use of agency power and for excluding personal financial inter-
ests from the process.44 Prior to 1980, publicly funded research results generally
became part of the public domain, freely available to academic researchers or
other parties to test its accuracy or to use in further research. 45 Federal law favored
granting government title to inventions developed with federal funds 46-a policy
that encouraged placing these inventions in the public domain.47 The government
agency could choose to dedicate an invention to the public domain by publishing
the results without obtaining a patent or by providing nonexclusive licenses to pri-
vate parties seeking to use a government-owned patent.48 Therefore, supporting
a high percentage of academic research with public funds was consistent with the
university's public mission and with academic freedom in providing grants in the
41. David Blumenthal, Biotech in Northeast Ohio Conference: Conflict of Interest in Biomedical
Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 377, 380 (2002); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus:
Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRuG L.J. 453, 457
(1997).
42. See R. C. Lewontin, The Cold War and the Transformation of the Academy, in THE COLD WAR
AND THE UNIVERSITY 1, 20-28 (1997). See generally KENNEY,SUpra note 40, at 13-15, 32-33.
43. See Jeffrey Brainard, NIH Callsfor Removal of Grant-Proposal Reviewers Who Have Conflicts of In-
terest, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 16,2004, at 22; Paulette Walker Campbell, Plan to Revamp NIH Peer-
Review Process Draws MixedAssessment, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 19,1999, at A40; Jeffrey Brainard,
Reassessing an NSF Program for Research Have-Nots, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 15,1999, at A3 1.
44. See KRIMSKY, supra note 7, at 204-07 (describing federal agency conflict of interest policies).
45. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Trans-
fer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663,1663 (1996); Rai,supra note 12, at 92-93.
46. See Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1671-91 (discussing the pre-1980 development of federal stat-
utes, agency regulations, and executive orders affecting title to federally funded research discover-
ies);see id. at 1677 ("Congress did not.., adopt a uniform policy vesting ownership of all federally-
sponsored research discoveries in the government, although over the years it did enact such a policy
on a more limited basis in a number of statutes applicable to particular programs or agencies.").
47. Id. at 1663.
48. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1675-76; Rai,supra note 12, at 97 n. 113.
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public interest, protecting faculty autonomy and independence, and preserving
communal values through expansion of the public domain.
The major economic, social, and political shifts of the 1980s had correspond-
ing effects on the institutional policies and practices of academic research. The
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which was enacted in the early stages of privatization, au-
thorized and encouraged federal fund recipients-including universities-to
patent the results of their federally funded research.49 The Bayh-Dole Act shifts
the presumption of ownership of federally funded inventions from title in the
government to title in the recipient of the federal funds. Under the statutory pre-
sumption of Bayh-Dole, the federal agency can retain title to the invention only by
demonstrating "exceptional circumstances" that support a determination that this
will "better promote the policy and objectives" of the Act.5" This shift of presump-
tive title changes the public policy priority from using public funding to expand
the public domain towards private control of federally funded research. Congress
justified this change as a means of promoting the commercialization of the inven-
tions developed through publicly funded research programs with particular em-
phasis on the collaboration between universities and businesses.5 The university
could now profit on its patents on federally funded research results by licensing
them to third parties, including exclusive licenses to for-profit corporations.52
The impact of the Bayh-Dole Act was strengthened by two additional phe-
nomena. First, the field of molecular biology exploded in the mid-1970s with the
49. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000); see Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 1665. The Bayh-Dole Act originally
allowed nonprofit organizations and small businesses to apply for patents on research results that
had been funded in whole or in part with federal funds. The Bayh-Dole Act was soon amended to
expand patenting rights to all businesses receiving federal research funds, regardless of the size of
the business. The extension of the Act to large business was done first by a Presidential Memoran-
dum in 1983 and then by Congress in a 1984 amendment to the Bayh-Dole Act. Id. at 1694-95,
1707 n.180.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2000); see Rai, supra note 12, at 147-48. Where the federal fund recipient
chooses to apply for a patent, the federal funding agency retains a nonexclusive license to use the
publicly funded invention. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 196. The Bayh-Dole Act also gives federal
agencies "march-in rights" to require the government contractor to issue licenses on a patent
when needed to "achieve practical application" of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000). Federal
agencies rarely, if ever, exercise these march-in rights. Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illus-
tration that Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of Fundamental Science is Not Always in the Public In -
terest, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 375, 382 (2000).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000);seealso Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 91 AMER. SCIENTIST 52, 54 (Jan-Feb. 2003).
52. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1663-65.
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discovery of the recombinant DNA (rDNA) process, which launched major ad-
vances in genetic engineering research and biotechnology.53 This shift in molecular
biology from "an analytic to a synthetic science" 54 opened the commercial potential
of the life sciences.5  Additionally, the federal courts became more "pro-patent" in
the field of life sciences following the United States Supreme Court's 1980 decision
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty56 that life forms "made by man" can be patented.57 In
1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit Court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over patent appeals from the federal district courts.58 The Federal Circuit has built
on the Supreme Court's pro-patent doctrine in Chakrabarty to expand the potential
for patents in the genetics field, including patents of gene fragments.
59
53. Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75 CHi.-
KENT L. REV. 15, 16-17 (1999).
54. Id. at 17-18. Professor Krimsky describes this event:
In that monumental discovery, the biological sciences had made the transition from an
analytic to a synthetic science.... The introduction of rDNA technology established the
absolute fungibility of genes, opening up possibilities for synthesizing new organisms
and establishing revolutionary methods for mass producing biological products. The
commercial opportunities of this discovery were recognized immediately by scientists.
Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. Professor Kenney describes this invention as "the single pivotal event in the transforma-
tion of the 'basic' science of molecular biology into an industry." KENNEY,supra note 40, at 23. The
potential commercial value of basic research has also been enhanced by the blurred distinction be-
tween basic and applied research in the biomedical field and the resulting shortened time period
between basic research and its application. Id. at 106; see also Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 196, 178
n. I (defining "basic research" as "'pure' research directed solely toward expanding human knowl-
edge, as opposed to 'applied' research directed toward solving practical problems[,]" and noting
that "whatever validity this dichotomy may have in other contexts, it is difficult to maintain in the
context of contemporary biotechnology research."); Rai, supra note 12, at 77 n. 1.
56. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
57. Id. at 309. The Court held that a genetically engineered bacterium that degraded crude oil
was patentable subject matter. The Court agreed that "products of nature, whether living or not"
are not patentable, but concluded that "human-made inventions," including living materials, may
be patented, defining the scope of patenting to "include anything under the sun that is made by
man." Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
58. See KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 4-5 (Dale H.
Hoscheit & Lisa M. Hemmendinger eds., Supp. 2000) (1995); see also Rai, supra note 12, at 102.
59. Yvonne Cripps, The Art and Science of Genetic Modification: Re-Engineering Patent Law and
Constitutional Orthodoxies, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Winter 2004, at 1,4-10 (2004) (offering her
"belief that the extraordinary nature of biotechnology has altered the ways in which the funda-
mental, traditional tenets of patent law are applied in that field[,]" lowering the standards of the
"classic tenets requir[ing] an invention that is, among other things, novel, nonobvious, and use-
ful.") (emphasis in original); Rai, supra note 12, at 100-09.
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Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act was planted in the fertile ground of pro-patent
policy in the courts and revolutionary developments in university genetics re-
search, leading to dramatic changes in university research policy and practice.
Following Bayh-Dole, universities expanded their technology transfer offices to
provide the infrastructure and personnel to "scour [university] labs"6 for com-
mercially profitable discoveries. The patent rate by U.S. universities soared from
264 patents obtained in 1979, before the Bayh-Dole Act, to nearly ten times that
number in 1997, with 2,436 patents. 61 In fiscal year 2000, U.S. universities filed
8,534 patents, an increase of 12 percent over 1999.62 From 1980 to 1990, patent
applications on NIH-funded inventions increased by almost 300 percent. 63 Sur-
veys of U.S. universities in 1991 and 2000 show that during that period new
patent applications increased by 238 percent, licensing agreements increased by
161 percent, and royalties increased by more than 520 percent. 64 About half of
the university-industry licensing agreements provide exclusive licenses to for-
profit corporations. 65 U.S. universities regularly apply for patents, not only in the
United States, but also in Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan. 66 U.S. universi-
ties also file for patents in "middle-income" developing countries, including
South Africa, Brazil, and India.67 In least developed countries, U.S. universities
generally authorize their licensees to file for patents, although the university re-
mains the patent owner.68
60. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDU-
CATION 141 (2003) (concluding that such commercial activities promote the public interest).
61. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 53.
62. Goldie Blumenstyk, Income From University Licenses on Patents Exceeded $1-Billion, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 22, 2002, at A31.
63. Krimsky, supra note 53, at 22.
64. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, SCIENCE,
Aug. 22, 2003, at 1052.
65. Id. (reporting by the Association of University Technology Managers).
66. Access to Essential Medicines and University Research: Building Best Practices 4 (Ctr. for Inter-
disc. Res. on AIDS, Yale University, Fall 2003), available at http://cira.med.yale.edu/ (last visited
Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Access to Essential Medicines]; see also KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN: THE
EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY ON THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE, THE ROYAL SOC'Y, at v
(Apr. 2003), available at www.royalsoc.ac.uk (discussing the similar phenomenon of profit cre-
ation and protection of intellectual property rights "as a primary policy objective for UK publicly
funded research.") (last visited Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN].
67. Access to Essential Medicines, supra note 66, at 4-5.
68. Id. at 4.
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Given the continued dominant role of federal funding to support academic
research, the Bayh-Dole Act remains the most important instrument for encour-
aging universities to increase their market activities through patents and licenses
of publicly funded research results.69 Additionally, implementation of the Bayh-
Dole Act indirectly facilitates other university-industry relationships. Although
public funds remain the greatest source of research support, corporate funding
has grown significantly, increasing by 93 percent between 1980 and 1984,"0 with
industry financing of the life sciences increasing from 7 percent of all academic
scientific research in 1993 to nearly 11.7 percent in 1994.71 In the 1980s and 1990s,
large-scale corporate funding of academic research increased through new
funding arrangements, often referred to as Strategic Corporate Alliances
(SCAs), involving multi-million dollar, multi-year corporate support for a uni-
versity department or program in exchange for exclusive licensing rights over
patents resulting from the academic research. 72 These include the 1982 Wash-
ington University-Monsanto agreement for $23.5 million of corporate funds
69. See Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Price Controls? The
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in
Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631,669 (2001) (discussing a Gov-
ernment Accounting Office report finding that "[d]uring fiscal years 1989 and 1990, technologies
developed with acknowledged NIH or NSF funding accounted for approximately 73% of all li-
cense income" in the 35 universities with the largest grants from these federal agencies) (citations
omitted).
70. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 178 n.2.
71. David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life
Sciences An Industry Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 369-71 (1996). A study of life sciences
companies concludes that "life-science firms were significantly more likely to support academic
research in 1994 than in 1984 . I.." Id. at 371 (finding an increase from 46% to 57% of such firms).
Another source reports that industry support of university research grew from "$1.45 billion in
1994 to $2.16 billion in 1999, an annual increase of nearly 10 percent." Charles F Larson, The
Boom in Industry Research, 16 ISSUES IN Sci. & TECH. 27,27 (Summer 2000). Corporations' financial
support of total academic research has been reported to have increased "from 2.3 percent in the
early 19 70s to almost 8 percent by the year 2000." BoK,supra note 60, at 12.
72. An early large-scale funding agreement was reached in 1974, between Harvard and Mon-
santo Corporation for a 12-year, $23 million grant to Harvard Medical School in exchange for
Monsanto's right to a worldwide exclusive license for inventions resulting from this research
funding. KENNEY, supra note 40, at 58. After entering into this agreement, Harvard eliminated its
policy, in existence since 1934, that had required approval from the president and fellows before
obtaining university "patents primarily concerned with therapeutics or public health" and further
requiring that such patents be taken only "for dedication to the public." Eisenberg, supra note 12,
at 181 n.9 (quoting DAVID DICKSON, THE NEW POLITICS OF SCIENCE 89 (1984)).
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over five years in exchange for exclusive licensing rights to patents resulting
from biomedical research,73 the 1994 MIT-Amgen agreement for $30 million of
corporate funding to the Department of Biology and the Department of Brain
and Cognitive Sciences over a ten year period in exchange for resulting patents
to be owned jointly by MIT and Amgen, 4 the 1997 MIT-Merck agreement for
$15 million in corporate funds over five years in exchange for licensing rights to
resulting patents, 75 and the 1998 University of California at Berkeley-Novartis
agreement for corporate funding of $25 million over five years in exchange for
exclusive licensing rights to about a third of the Plant and Microbial Biology de-
partment's discoveries. 76
The trends toward private ownership of academic research have been em-
braced by individual faculty members who will share in the profits resulting
from university-owned patents of their publicly funded research discoveries. 77
Additionally, faculty relationships with industry have increased through ex-
panded corporate research contracts and faculty consulting arrangements with
industry.78 Faculty often enter into consulting arrangements with businesses
while continuing their university teaching and research, with an estimate that
about half of life sciences faculty members act as consultants for industry.79 Since
the mid-1980s, 21 to 28 percent of life sciences faculty members have consistently
received research support from industry.0 During that time period, about 7 to 8
percent of faculty members reported that they held equity in a company related
73. KENNEY, supra note 40, at 67-69; Krimsky, supra note 53, at 28-29. After being renewed
three times, Monsanto's financing of the university came to about $100 million. Id. at 28.
74. Andrew Lawler, Last of the Big Time Spenders?, 299 SCIENCE 330 (2003); MIT's Alliances with
Industry, MIT NEWS, available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/nr/2000/alliance.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2004).
75. William H. Honan, Corporations Still Give, But Also Get, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at B9.
76. Novartis is a Swiss pharmaceutical corporation that also produced genetically engineered
crops. Press & Washburn, supra note 40, at 39; Vicky Elliott, Who Calls the Tune?, UNESCO
COURIER, Nov. 1,2001, at 21. See also Goldie Blumenstyk, A Vilified Corporate Partnership Produces
Little Change (Except Better Facilities), CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 22, 2001, at 24.
77. The Bayh-Dole Act requires the university to share with a faculty inventor the profits from
royalties related to a university-owned patent on an invention created wholly or partially with
public funds. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2004).
78. See BoK, supra note 60, at 62, 151.
79. See Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 379. See generally Krimsky, supra note 53.
80. See Blumenthal, supra note 41, at 378; see also Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 454, 456 (2003) (dis-
cussing studies showing extensive financial relationships between faculty and industry).
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to their research.8 During the 1980s and 1990s, faculty participated in founding
twenty-four Fortune 500 companies and over 600 non-Fortune 500 companies
in the life sciences.82 A 1992 study found that about one-third of lead authors of
789 articles in leading scientific journals had financial interests in their research,
including patents, equity ownerships, or a position on the advisory board or
board of directors.83
B. Impact of Privatization on the University: Local, National, and Global Implications
Advocates of privatization and commercialization of academic research
argue that the public, universities, and faculty all benefit from the increased mar-
keting of academic research. 4 From this perspective, commercialization of aca-
demic research is consistent with the university's public mission by promoting
development of academic research that otherwise would be ignored. Exclusive li-
censing of university-owned patents on publicly funded academic research creates
industry incentives to invest further capital needed to develop the patented results
into marketable commercial products. Without this guarantee of exclusive con-
trol, for-profit corporations would not risk the capital needed to develop academic
research that belongs to the public domain." Advocates of commercialization also
81. Blumenthal,supra note 41, at 379.
82. Id. at 385.
83. Bekelman, supra note 80, at 456 (discussing Sheldon Krimsky et al., Scientific Journals and
Their Authors' Financial Interests: A Pilot Study, 67 PSYCHOTHER. PSYCHOSOM. 194 (1998)); see also
Sheldon Krimsky et al., Financial Interests ofAuthors in Scientific Journals: A Pilot Study of 14 Pub-
lications, 2 Sci. & ENc. ETHICS 395, 395 (1996).
84. See, e.g., BoK, supra note 60, at 15-16, 28, 141; Lita Nelsen, The Role of University Technology
Transfer Operations in Assuring Access to Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Countries, 3 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 301,301-02 (2003).
85. See Nelsen, supra note 84, at 302. Supporters of the Bayh-Dole Act assert that privatizing
federal research results will encourage utilization of federally funded inventions, citing evidence
of the low licensing rate of government-owned patents prior to 1980 and the increase in univer-
sity-owned patents and corporate licenses after 1980. See BoK, supra note 60, at 141; Eisenberg,
supra note 45, at 1663-64, 1676-77, 1702; Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 181-82. As Professor Rebecca
Eisenberg has argued, however, the statistical evidence concerning pre-1980 licensing understates
the actual use of federally funded inventions, given the common practice of unlicensed use of gov-
ernment-owned patents and the availability of unpatented federally funded inventions and the
pre-Bayh-Dole practice of the Department of Defense (DoD) to permit private contractors to re-
tain title to patents on DoD-sponsored research. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1702-04. In agencies
such as Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which commonly retained title to federally
funded inventions, the licensing rate was higher. Id. at 1703.
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support the practice of exchanging private corporate research funds for exclusive
licenses to university patents, arguing that a for-profit corporation will not invest
in large-scale funding of academic research without guarantees of exclusive access
to resulting patents.86 Advocates of such university-industry relationships also
deny that there is a qualitative difference between the influences on academic re-
search resulting from government agency funding as compared with private in-
dustry funding.8 7 In either case, they argue, research agendas will be shaped by the
interests of the funding source and in both instances faculty will continue to exer-
cise the same degree of academic freedom in choosing and implementing their re-
search projects.8" Any concerns about additional coercion from private corporate
interests can be addressed by negotiating agreements with corporate funders that
protect faculty from excessive corporate oversight.89 The argument in favor of
SCAs is bolstered by the university's need for millions of dollars to sustain modern
scientific laboratories.9" Furthermore, advocates of commercialization view aca-
demic freedom as including faculty rights to profit from patented research,
whether through university negotiated licenses or through spin off corporations
founded by faculty.91
These arguments in support of privatization and commercialization of aca-
demic research equate the public interest with the private interests of for-profit
corporations.92 From this viewpoint, corporate market position and profitability
are the primary determinants of whether academic research reaches the public.
Defining the public interest as synonymous with the corporate interest ignores
86. See Heather Hamme Ramirez, Defending The Privatization of Research Tools: An Examina-
tion of The "Tragedy of The Anticommons" In Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY
L.J. 359, 365-66, 373-74 (2004); Thursby & Thursby,supra note 64.
87. See BoK, supra note 60, at 61-62; Blumenstyk,supra note 76.
88. Blumenstyk,supra note 76; Elliott, supra note 76.
89. See BOK, supra note 60, at 143-44; Tom Abate, Report Emphasizes Biotech's Need for
Academic-Corporate Study; Authors Discuss How to Continue Research, Avoid Ethical Lapses, S.F.
CHRON., June 11, 2001, at D1.
90. See Blumenstyk,supra note 76.
91. See BoK, supra note 60, at 147-48; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Aca-
demic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1380, 1384 (1988) (posing the question of
how universities can both respect individual faculty academic freedom while also responding to
the problem of private research sponsors seeking control over academic research where the faculty
find such control acceptable).
92. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the University's Soul,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 782 (2004) (reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE:
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)); Lieberwitz, supra note 32.
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both the conflict between the public interest and private corporate interests and
the resulting damage to the public interest from privatization and commercializa-
tion of academic research. These negative consequences can be analyzed at three
levels, beginning with the "local" context of the university, moving to the national
level of consequences to the public in the United States, and finally, evaluating the
social implications at a global level under multilateral trade agreements.
1. Consequences at the "Local" Level of the University
The conflict between public and private interests resulting from privatiza-
tion and commercialization of academia is more than theoretical. In significant
respects, private economic interests have won in this conflict, resulting in critical
changes in university practices and the academic research culture. The public
domain has been restricted through licensing of university-owned patents, ap-
proximately half of which are for exclusive corporate licenses.93 The nature of
university research, which often makes discoveries of "upstream" research, am-
plifies the restrictive effects of patenting academic research discoveries. Up-
stream research refers to the results at early stages of research, such as isolation
of gene sequences, which may be used as research tools in further research in
multiple and diverse areas.94 Patents on upstream research have been criticized
as impeding further research, owing to their overly broad scope, limits on their
use under exclusive licenses, and the burdens and costs of non-exclusive li-
censes.9" One example is research concerning mutations of the HFE gene, which
93. See Thursby & Thursby, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
94. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699-700 (1998); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 51, at
55-56.
95. See Cripps, supra note 59, at 4-12; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 699-700; Rai,supra
note 12, at 107-08; Rai & Eisenberg,supra note 51, at 54-56; KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN,SUpra note 66,
at 9-13. See also Naomi Freundlich, Will Increasingly Aggressive Licensing Terms on Research Tool
Patents Hurt Basic Research?, SIGNALS MAG., June 4, 1998,at http'//www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.
nsf/61dbe 17a63981409882565ae00822f19/b931de6bb4a 15ae788256618005b6335 ?OpenDocument
(last accessed Oct. 4, 2004); Naomi Freundlich, Cre-lox Controversy Divides Institutions, Prompts
NIH Panel, SIGNALS MAC., June 12, 1998, at http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/
657bO6742b5748e888256570005cbaO1/a91504e7700ed9bO882566210046c958?OpenDocument (last ac-
cessed Oct. 4, 2004) (discussing the impediments to research caused by "reach-through" agree-
ments, in which the owner of a patented upstream research tool seeks to share in the profits of
subsequent downstream patents through licensing agreements that provide for royalties on future
sales of downstream products or for exclusive or nonexclusive licenses to use downstream discov-
eries).
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have been identified as central to the serious illness, hemochromatosis. Enforce-
ment of privately owned patents on the HFE gene and tests for the gene has im-
peded research and diagnostic tests for the HFE gene mutations.96 Similar
impediments are created by Myriad Genetics' broad patents on two breast can-
cer genes, BRCAI and BRCA2, which cover mutations on the genes, the use of
these mutations in medical diagnosis and screening for breast cancer, and the de-
velopment of therapeutic treatment of cancers with mutations in either gene.
9 7
The courts and the U.S. Patent Office have been criticized for loosening the
criteria for patentability, particularly with regard to the nonobviousness and util-
ity requirements, which ensure that an invention adds to scientific knowledge in
a significant way and will be of immediate practical use.9" Lowered standards for
judging these criteria, however, have resulted in patents issued on upstream re-
search, including genes and gene sequences, which often falls in the realm of dis-
coveries that will contribute to further research, rather than inventions with
identifiable utility.' Universities have, in some cases, aggressively protected their
patent rights, including broad patents on upstream research discoveries. For ex-
ample, Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, to-
gether with their exclusive licensee, Ariad Pharmaceuticals, sued Eli Lilly & Co.
for infringement of a patent on a basic genetic research discovery (the cell-signaling
96. See Cripps,supra note 59, at 7. An example in the area of agriculture is the patenting of genes
and patents on methods for isolating and cloning DNA, which have been identified as creating
difficult obstacles that have delayed the development of beta-carotene-enriched "golden rice." See
Roger N. Beachy, IP Policies and Serving the Public, 299 SCIENCE 473 (Jan. 24, 2003).
97. Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: The Development and Application of BRCA
Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 132-33 (2002). The discoveries of these breast cancer genes were
based, in part, on academic research funded by the NIH. Id. Myriad charges health care providers
approximately $2,700 to administer the screening test to detect the presence of the two genes.
Cripps, supra note 59, at 6 ($2,680 charge for the screening test); Krimsky, supra note 53, at 37
($2,400 charge for the screening test). As Professor Cripps explains, this expense is prohibitive for
individuals whose insurance does not cover the test and many hospitals and health care providers
will not pay this high fee. Cripps,supra note 59, at 6. Without the licensing fees, the cost for the ge-
netic test for breast cancer would be about $50. Charles Leroux, Biotech's Traffic Cop: Chicago At-
torney Lori Andrews Stands Where Science and the Law Intersect, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2001, at C 12.
98. See Cripps, supra note 59, at 4-5; Rai,supra note 12, at 107-08.
99. See Cripps, supra note 59, at 4-8. See also KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN, supra note 66, at 9-13.
PRIVATIZATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH
pathway for nuclear factor kappa B), claiming the right to royalties on sales of
products developed with the use of the patented research tool. °0
The change in the relationship between universities and private financial
supporters has been described as "a shift from corporate contribution to corporate in-
vestment in academia."'' Large-scale industry-university funding agreements com-
monly include provisions that break down the wall of separation between third-
party financial supporters and academic research, limiting faculty independence
and autonomy. SCAs condition multi-million dollar corporate funding upon signif-
icant corporate involvement in decisions over research grants, the presence of cor-
porate representatives on campus, and corporate pre-publication review of research
results. Specifically, in addition to exclusive licensing rights, SCAs have provided
the funding corporation's representatives with seats on the university committees
that review and select faculty research grant proposals,0 2 special access to faculty re-
searchers and graduate students, 3 and the right to delay publication for three to six
months to review research results and for filing patent applications."
Privatization and commercialization have also resulted in changes in the ac-
ademic research process. Faculty report increased secrecy by their colleagues over
100. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 57. This research discovery resulted from federally funded
research by university scientists at Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Re-
search. Despite the importance of this basic research tool for further research on a wide range of
diseases, the universities obtained "a broad patent claiming all drugs that work by inhibiting NF-
Kb cell signaling" and granted an exclusive license on the patent to Ariad Pharmaceuticals.
101. Charles C. Caldart, Industry Investment in University Research, 8 Scl. TECH. & HUM. VALUES,
Spring 1983, at 24, 25.
102. See id. For example, the UC Berkeley-Syngenta (formerly Novartis) agreement gave
Syngenta exclusive licensing rights to about a third of the department's discoveries and held two
of five seats on the department's research committee that made decisions on distribution of the
funds. Id.; Press & Washburn, supra note 40, at 39-40. Syngenta was given the right to review all
proposed publications and presentations by participating faculty and their graduate students, in-
cluding publicly funded research. Blumenstyk, supra note 76, at 24. The agreement also autho-
rized Syngenta to ask for a ninety-day publication delay to provide time for patent applications.
Id. Novartis has large-scale funding agreements with other universities, including $24 million
paid over a six-year period to University of Maryland's Psychiatric Research Center in exchange
for half the seats on the eight-member panel that distributes the funds, exclusive commercial
access to its bank of brain tissue, and exclusive licensing rights to its patents. Douglas M. Birch &
Gary Cohn, Standing Up to Industry: As Corporations Increasingly Hold Their Purse Strings, Many
Researchers Feel Pressed to Deliver Favorable Results, BALT. SUN, June 26, 2001, at I A; see supra notes
72-76 and accompanying text; see also KENNEY, supra note 40, at 55-72.
103. Id. at 55-72.
104. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 216-26; Krimsky,supra note 53, at 30; Joshua A. Newberg &
Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Values, and Rules of Engagement for In-
dustry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 187, 201-12 (2002).
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their research methods and results.05 They attribute this change in the traditional
academic culture of openness during ongoing research to the concern with pre-
serving patent rights and with corporate funding conditions of confidentiality
prior to publication of research results."6 Faculty also describe the contrast be-
tween academic values that emphasize giving credit to prior work of other re-
searchers, in the tradition of Newton's statement that he was able to see farther by
"standing on ye sholders of Giants," and the patent application process, which re-
quires the researcher to distinguish the research discovery from others.0 7 Rela-
tionships may also change between faculty and graduate students, whose value as
cheap labor in the search for profitable research discoveries conflicts with an aca-
demic tradition of faculty mentorship of Ph.D. students in the discipline.
0 8
Changes in the research process also include what faculty do with their re-
search results. Within a traditional academic culture, faculty reputation has been
largely based on being the first to publish research results in scholarly journals in
the public domain.10 9 By participating in the patent process, faculty instead engage
in the restriction of the public domain. Further, the insertion of the university
technology transfer office and corporate funders into the research process delays
publication during the patent application process, which may include prior corpo-
rate review to determine a corporate funder's interest in covering patent applica-
tion costs or in anticipated licensing rights. While the costs of patents to the public
domain are generally justified as encouraging individuals to invest the time and
105. See KENNEY, supra note 40, at 108-11, 121-31; Blumenthal et al., supra note 71, at 372-73;
Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 1375; Jonathan King & Doreen Stabinsky, Patents on Cells, Genes, and
Organisms Undermine the Exchange of Scientific Ideas, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 1999, at D6;
see also Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer
Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the
Myriad Genetics'BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FooD DRUc L.J. 133, 149 (2004) (discussing the neg-
ative impact on researchers of the decreased sharing of basic data).
106. See KENNEY, supra note 40, at 108-11, 121-31; Blumenthal, et al., supra note 71, at 368, 372-
73; David Blumenthal et al., University-Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology: Implica-
tionsfor the University, 232 SCIENCE 1361, 1361-66 (1986); Eisenberg,supra note 91, at 1375; Krimsky,
supra note 53, at 29-31; Birch & Cohn, supra note 102.
107. Lawrence M. Sung, Collegiality and Collaboration in the Age of Exclusivity, 3 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 411, 417 n.17, 436-38 (2000) (citing ROBERT MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 31 n.3 (1965) (quoting Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert
Hooke (Feb. 5, 1765 or 1676)); see Kathryn Packer & Andrew Webster, Patenting Culture in
Science: Reinventing the Scientific Wheel of Credibility, 21 Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 427 (1996).
108. See KENNEY, supra note 40, at 88, 117-18.
109. See Rai,supra note 12, at 92.
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expense necessary for the risky work of invention, such a rationale does not apply
to academic research. A patent owner's monopoly rights during the patent period
create an incentive to invent and disclose the owner's inventions to the public."'
Faculty already have an incentive to invent and disclose without the need for
patent incentives based on the communal values of science and the professional
structure of the university that judges faculty merit largely on the basis of their re-
search and publications."' These professional incentives have been highly success-
ful, as evidenced by the intense competition among academic scientists to be the
first to publish their research results and methodology."' 2
2. National Consequences of Privatization and Commercialization of
Academic Research
The public mission of public or private nonprofit universities describes the so-
cial role of academia to serve the public interest, which requires university and
faculty independence from conflicting interests of either government or private
parties. The university's public mission, though, also provides a common ground
with the social role of the government to serve the public interest. Similar to public
funding of governmental services, public subsidies to nonprofit corporations re-
flect a public policy of encouraging nonprofit corporations to provide certain types
of goods and services for the public welfare, rather than for profit."3 As nonprofit
corporations, universities receive public subsidies designed to support and main-
tain their efforts to provide education in the public interest."4 In this way, the
110. See Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1668. As of 1995, the U.S. patent term is 20 years from the
date of filing the patent application; prior to 1995, the term was 17 years from the date of issuance
of the patent. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 4-5 (5th ed. 2001); Dale H.
Hoscheit & Lisa M. Hemmendinger, 2000 Cumulative Supplement, in KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, Bio-
TECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 137 (Supp. 2000).
111. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 183-84; Rai, supra note 12, at 88-94.
112. See Rai,supra note 12, at 119-20.
113. See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 7-32 (1992), discussed in
Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy,
7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 565-68 (1998); Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing
the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U.L.
REV. 1061, 1083-85 (2000); Peter D. Blumberg, From "Publish or Perish" to "Profit or Perish": Reve-
nues From University Technology Transfer and the § 501(c) (3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89,
101-105 (1996); John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Ex-
emption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 857-77 (1993).
114. Education is the second largest nonprofit service employer in the United States. BURTON A.
WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 72 (1988).
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university's institutional independence is similar to other private nonprofit orga-
nizations, which receive public subsidies under U.S. law through public funding,
federal corporate income tax exemption, federal tax deductibility of donations," 5
and state sales tax and property tax exemptions," 6 on the condition that they fulfill
their public interest goals." 7 Traditional policies and practices of academic free-
dom-including faculty autonomy and independence-have been integral to en-
suring that faculty work can further the university's social role." 8
The privatization of academic research through university patenting and li-
censing activities has important repercussions for the public. Prior to the Bayh-
Dole Act, publicly funded academic research results generally became part of
the public domain, a practice that was consistent with the university's public
mission and with the logic that publicly subsidized research belongs to the pub-
lic. The federal government held the title to federally funded research discover-
ies, which were either placed directly into the public domain or were made
widely available to the public through nonexclusive licensing to government
patents." 9 Such publicly funded research results in the public domain were suc-
cessfully used by industry in further research and development (R&D) that even-
tually led to patented products. For example, an internal NIH study shows that
publicly funded academic basic research was instrumental in pharmaceutical
corporations' development of five top selling drugs worldwide in 1994 and 1995,
including Zantac (to treat ulcers), Vasotec (to treat hypertension), and Prozac (to
115. Nonprofit private universities qualify for such exemptions as 5 01(c)(3) organizations, under
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), serving educational purposes. Blumberg,supra note 113, at 101-05; see also
Bucholtz, supra note 113, at 560-61; Colombo, supra note 113, at 857-77 (discussing the theories
underlying tax exemptions).
116. Blumberg, supra note 113, at 91-92; Bucholtz, supra note 113, at 561-62; Colombo, supra
note 113, at 855-56.
117. For an excellent discussion of a policy proposal to deny the 501(c)(3) tax exemption to
university-industry licensing agreements that are inconsistent with the public purpose basis for
the tax-exempt status, see Blumberg, supra note 113, at 134-46.
118. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
119. In some agencies, a university or other government contractor could petition the federal
agency to shift title from the government to the contractor. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1683-84,
1691-92. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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treat depression). 2 ' These drugs were developed and patented in the 1970s by
pharmaceutical companies,' 21 which drew heavily from U.S. publicly funded ac-
ademic research discoveries in the public domain and from publications by aca-
demic researchers in other countries.'
22
By authorizing patents on federally funded research, Bayh-Dole encour-
aged universities to restrict the public domain by establishing private ownership
and control of academic research. With exclusive licensing by industry of
university-owned patents, this private control becomes monopoly corporate
control over publicly funded research during the twenty-year patent period.
23
The patenting and exclusive licensing of publicly funded research imposes mul-
tiple costs on the public: through public funding of the academic research;
124
through the restriction of the public domain with patents and licenses that im-
pede access to research results; 125 through the university's service of private
rather than public interests; 126 and again through paying monopoly prices for
goods owing to exclusive licensing of university-owned patents, as well as the
private corporations' patents on the end products. 127 Examples include the Uni-
versity of Minnesota's exclusive license of its patent on carbovir, which resulted
from NIH-funded research, to the pharmaceutical corporation GlaxoSmith-
Kline, which used carbovir to develop the antiretroviral drug abacavir sulfate,
marketed under the brand name Ziagen. 121 Ziagen is a very profitable drug,
120. Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry's R&D "Scare Card", CONG. REPORT, app. C
(Public Citizen Congress Watch), July 2001, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
rdmyths.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Rx R&D Myths]. Public Citizen's Congress
Watch obtained this NIH report through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The
five drugs studied sold $1 billion or more in 1994 and 1995. Id. Zantac costs about $100 for 60 pills;
Vasotec costs about $135 for 60 pills; and Prozac costs about $75 for 30 pills. Drug Industry Gets Sig-
nificant Help from U.S. Taxpayers, Report Says, AssocIATED PRESS, July 23, 2001.
121. Rx R&D Myths, supra note 120, at 7. The pharmaceutical corporations included Glaxo, Bur-
roughs Wellcome, Merck, Squibb, and Eli Lilly. Id. at 14, 20, 27, 33.
122. Id. at 7. The five drugs "were conceived through research conducted in the 1950s, '60s and
early '70s." Id.
123. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
124. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1666; Lieberwitz, supra note 32.
125. Seesupra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 69-83, 92-94 and accompanying text.
127. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1666-69; Lieberwitz, supra note 92, at 782; Lieberwitz, supra
note 32.
128. Peter Ritter, Bitter Pills, CITY PACES, July 4,2001, at http://www.citypages.com/databank/22/
1074/article9665.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
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with predicted annual sales of up to $800 million, including royalties of 5 to 10
percent of sales going to the University of Minnesota.'29 Publicly funded re-
searchers at Yale University discovered the application of Stavudine (d4T) as an
antiretroviral AIDS treatment. 3 ° Yale exclusively licensed its patent on Stavu-
dine to the pharmaceutical corporation, Bristol-Myers Squibb, which sells the
drug under the brand name Zerit"' for an average price of $8.56 for the dose of
two 40 mg tablets.'32 Yale profited from the sales, earning at least $261 million in
royalties between 1994 and 2000.'
The multiple costs to the public of patenting and licensing of academic re-
search apply to corporate funding as well. A conflict exists between public and
private interests where corporate funding is the quid pro quo for exclusive cor-
porate licensing of university-owned patents.'34 Like the patenting and exclusive
129. Id. University of Minnesota's share of a lump sum of $7.5 million, plus royalties of between
5-10% of sales was the result of a settlement agreement that resolved a patent infringement suit by
the university against GlaxoSmithKline. Id.
130. Ellen F M. 't Hoen, The Responsibility of Research Universities to Promote Access to Essential
Medicines, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHics 293,294-95 (2003); Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 28, 2001, at 31, 52, available at http://www.nytimes.comAibrary/magazine/
home/20010128mag-aids.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004); Philippe Demenet, The High Cost of Liv-
ing, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Feb. 4, 2002, available at http://mondediplo.com/2002/02/
04stavudine (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
131. 't Hoen, supra note 130, at 294-95.
132. See Demenet,supra note 130. In South Africa, Bristol-Myers Squibb charged $2.23 per dose,
which most people could not afford. Id.
133. Id. Another example of publicly funded academic research leading to discovery of an essen-
tial medicine is the anti-HIV drug T-20, patented by Duke University and marketed by Roche
under the brand name Fuzeon for about $20,000 per year in the United States. See Consumer
Project on Technology, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/t20/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2004).
134. See Lieberwitz, supra note 32; Lieberwitz, supra note 92, at 789. An external evaluation of
the large-scale corporate funding agreement between University of California at Berkeley and
Syngenta concluded that universities should avoid such agreements, due to the conflict of interests
created within the university. See Lawrence Busch et al., External Review of the Collaborative Re-
search Agreement between Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute, Inc. and the Regents of the Uni-
versity of California (2004), available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/07/
externalnovartisreview.pdf; Rex Dalton, Biotech Funding Deal Judged To Be 'a Mistake' for Ber-
keley, 430 NATURE 598 (2004) (noting the unusual nature of the Berkeley-Syngenta agreement in
funding an entire academic unit, rather than funding specific researchers or scientific research
groups); Goldie Blumenstyk, Reviewers Give Thumbs Down to Corporate Deal at Berkeley, CHRON.
HIGHER EDuc., Aug. 6, 2004, at A25 (quoting the external evaluation report's criticism of the
agreement provision of Syngenta's first rights to exclusive licenses on inventions by participating
faculty members, even if their work had been federally funded: "Such an occurrence strains con-
ventional thinking on the proper stewardship of public funds[.]"). See supra notes 76, 102 and
PRIVATIZATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH
licensing of publicly funded research, the industry-university exchange of re-
search funds for monopoly control over patents restricts the public domain of ac-
ademic research. As in the case of publicly funded research, this university-
industry relationship favors private commercial interests over the traditional
public interest goal of the university. By patenting academic research discoveries
and selling the rights to use the patents, universities substitute their own finan-
cial interests for the public interest. Furthermore, by entering exclusive licensing
agreements, universities also serve the private financial interests of the exclusive
licensees. Even if the university broadens access to its patents through nonexclu-
sive licensing of its patents, the private ownership and marketing of the aca-
demic research still conflicts with the public mission of the university, which
requires academic research that is independent of private financial interests.'
35
The commercialization of academic research may well reduce both the
scope and quality of the research. The growth of university practices modeled on
for-profit businesses, including priorities on commercially viable research,
protection of private ownership rights of intellectual property, and increases in
secrecy, undermines the communal academic culture that encourages innova-
tion and experimentation. 36 The focus on profit potential of research may en-
courage short-term applied research rather than longer-term theoretic
research. 137 Studies have reported that corporately financed researchers are sig-
nificantly more likely than researchers who are not funded by the corporation to
reach favorable results concerning a corporation's product, including pharma-
accompanying text. Michigan State University sociology professor Lawrence Busch, who headed
the evaluation group, separately described the corporate funding agreement as creating the im-
pression that the academic department was "biased toward the funding source," stating that
"[ulniversities as institutions can only be objective observers on the scientific and regulatory scene
to the extent that some distance remains between them and industry funding sources." Blumen-
styk, supra.
135. On the relationship between university independence and its institutional legitimacy, see
SHEILA SLAUGHTER & LARRY LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND THE ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY (1997); CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE: NEW INTERSECTIONS OF INDUSTRY AND
ACADEMIA (Henry Etzkowitz et al. eds., 1998).
136. See Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African
Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 342-43 (2004); Julia Porter
Liebeskind, Risky Business: Universities and Intellectual Property, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 49,
49-52, available at http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/ 20 0 1/OISO/SoOllie.htm; supra
notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
137. KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN,SUpra note 66, at v.
RISA L. LIEBERWITZ
ceutical products.'38 Some pharmaceutical companies have commissioned uni-
versity professors to write an article, which is then ghostwritten by an employee
of the drug company or medical marketing company and submitted to the pro-
fessors for their approval prior to submission to a medical journal.'39 There have
been incidents, as well, of corporate funders placing strong pressure on faculty
researchers to suppress research results that go against the corporation's eco-
nomic interests. For example, University of California, San Francisco researcher
James Kahn was pressured by corporate funder Immune Response Corporation
to alter his negative clinical trial results of the company's HIV vaccine. 4 ° When
Kahn refused, Immune Response sued him.''
Conflicts of interest have led to justified concerns about the objectivity of
faculty researchers and the reliability of research studies. The scientific journals
Nature, the New England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical
Association, and the Lancet, now require that authors of articles accepted for
publication "submit sources of funding, records of employment, and histories of
financial investments."'42 Readers will also be informed of an author's refusal to
disclose this information. 4 3 These journals are considering requiring corpora-
tions to publicly register all drug trial results as a condition to publishing any
specific trial results.'44
138. Press & Washburn,supra note 40, at 42; Mildred K. Cho & Lisa A. Bero, The Quality of Drug
Studies Published in Symposium Proceedings, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MEn. 485 (1996); Mark Clayton,
Corporate Cash Campus Labs, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, June 19, 2001, at 11; Krimsky, supra note
53, at 34; Bekelman et al.,supra note 80, at 456.
139. Melody Petersen, Madison Ave. Has Growing Role in the Business of Drug Research, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at Al (noting that "[a] 1998 survey of named authors writing for some of the
nation's top journals, including The Journal of the American Medical Association, which pub-
lished the survey, found that II percent of the articles had been ghostwritten.").
140. Ritter, supra note 128.
141. Id.;see also Press & Washburn,supra note 40, at 42 (describing a case in 1996 where four uni-
versity science researchers resigned after their corporate sponsor, Sandoz [now Novartis], altered
a manuscript to remove findings of potential negative effects of the corporation's drugs: "The re-
searchers aired their concerns in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association: 'We be-
lieved that the sponsor.., was attempting to wield undue influence on the nature of the final
paper. This effort was so oppressive that we felt it inhibited academic freedom."').
142. Kathleen Huvane, Researchers Required to Show Money Trail, WORLD WATCH, Jan.-Feb.
2002, at 7.
143. Id.
144. Barry Meier, Glaxo to Begin Posting Drug Trial Results, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,2004, at C2; Barry
Meier, A.M.A. Adds Its Voice to Callfor Disclosure on Drug Trials, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,2004, at Cl.
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A less tangible, but essential, measure of the impact of universities' market
activities is the potential reduction of the public trust that universities are fulfill-
ing their public mission rather than pursuing private economic interests. A re-
cent decision from the Federal Circuit expressed skepticism that universities
with active technology transfer programs can plausibly present themselves as
pursuing purely scholarly activities. In Madey v. Duke University,'45 the Federal
Circuit refused to apply the common law patent "experimental use exemp-
tion"146 to Duke's use of patented laser technology in its regular "business" of re-
search in its physics department. The court found no basis for applying the
narrow experimental use exemption more liberally to nonprofit institutions,
such as Duke University, than to for-profit businesses.'47 In dicta, the court im-
plied its skepticism of Duke's attempt to claim the experimental use exemption
while simultaneously "pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program from
which it derives a not insubstantial revenue stream."' 48 With this statement, the
court expresses the view that Duke-and other universities-are institutionally
indistinguishable from for-profit corporations in pursuing their private eco-
nomic interests.) 4
9
3. Global Implications of the Corporate University
Viewing the issues of university privatization and commercialization from
a global perspective reveals the impact of U.S. national policy and multilateral
trade policy on other countries-particularly on developing countries. The
145. 307 E3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
146. Plaintiff Madey sued Duke University for patent infringement based on Duke's use of
Madey's patented laser technology in the Duke physics department. Madey had been a tenured
professor in the Duke University physics department. After Duke removed him from the position
of director of the free electron laser lab, Madey resigned from the faculty. Duke continued to use
Madey's patented laser technology. Id. at 1352-53. The district court had held that the common
law "experimental use" exemption immunized from patent infringement liability Duke's use of
the patented laser technology "solely for research, academic or experimental purposes." Id. at
1355.
147. Id. at 1362-63. The circuit court emphasized that the experimental use exemption is a nar-
row, judicially created exemption from enforcement of patent infringement claims, covering only
research carried out merely "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry." Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
148. Id. at 1362-63 n.7.
149. See Lieberwitz, supra note 92, at 786; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields,
SCIENCE, Feb. 14, 2003, at 1018, 1019.
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Bayh-Dole Act is explicit in its goal of providing a competitive market advan-
tage to U.S. industry.' Where federal funds have been granted to a non-U.S.
contractor, the Bayh-Dole Act authorizes the funding agreement to withhold
from that non-U.S. contractor the right to retain title to an invention. 5' The
Bayh-Dole Act requires private patent owners on federally funded inventions-
which would include universities-to give preference on exclusive licenses to
businesses that will use the licenses to manufacture the invention substantially in
the United States.
52
An international perspective also brings into relief the ideological underpin-
nings of the Bayh-Dole Act policy of encouraging the commercialization of pub-
licly funded research discoveries. This strong favoring of private ownership of
intellectual property-including publicly funded research-reflects an ideology
that places private property and markets at the center of public policy, viewing
patents as a "natural right,"'53 in contrast to an ideological view of intellectual
property rights more as a privilege, which is socially constructed.'54 Under a
natural rights approach, protecting patents is the goal of public policy. In con-
trast, under a "social construction" approach, the goal of public policy is defined
first, followed by a determination of whether patents will promote the public
policy goal. Several examples illustrate the difference between viewing patents
150. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting Contro-
versy, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633, 636 (1994).
151. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (1980).
152. 35 USC § 204 (1980); see also Eisenberg,supra note 150, at 650.
153. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 481, 486
(2002). Sell notes that even the U.S. courts did not take a natural rights, pro-patent approach to in-
tellectual property until the early to mid-1980s, which was also the first time the courts stopped re-
ferring to patents as monopolies. Prior to this period, U.S. legislative and judicial policy viewed
patents with suspicion, given their anti-competitive effects. Id. at 489-90.
154. See KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN,supra note 66, at 1, 7-8; Sell,supra note 153, at 496-97. This view
of patents as a privilege describes the patent systems in Europe, "granted at the discretion of gov-
ernments in pursuit of economic, social, or technological objectives." KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN,
supra note 66, at 7-8. This approach is consistent with the broader exclusions of patentable subject
matter in European patent systems and the application of a standard of "public order" or morality
to determine patentability. Id.; see Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 476, 485-95, 517-28 (2003) (discussing
the lack of a statutory criterion of morality in U.S. patent law and the demise of the judicial doc-
trine of "moral utility" following the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980), in contrast to the express consideration of morality in the European Union, in-
cluding the Convention on the Grant of European Patents and the European Union Biotechnol-
ogy Directive).
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as a goal or as a means. The first example concerns the problem of adherence to
therapy in AIDS treatment, which is made more difficult when patients must
take multiple pills. The major obstacle to combining three essential antiretro-
viral drugs into one pill lies in the patenting of these medications by different
corporations, which are unwilling to cross-license their patents. 5 ' In India and
Thailand, which do not yet have patent protections on pharmaceuticals, some
generic companies have been able to combine the three drugs into one pill.'56
Thus, defining the goal as protecting patents excludes resolution of the health is-
sue. In contrast, defining the goal as the successful treatment of disease leads to
the conclusion that placing medical knowledge into the public domain is the ap-
propriate means to reach the public health goal.'57
Two examples highlight the importance of maintaining a focus on the pub-
lic health goal to find the most effective means to provide universal access to
medicines. UNICEF's highly successful global vaccination campaign achieved a
vaccination rate of over 80 percent.'58 In Brazil, considered a developing country,
the government has made the decision to deliver free AIDS treatment to all pa-
tients who cannot afford the medication.'59 The means chosen to achieve this
goal is the manufacture of generic drugs at a fraction of the cost of patented
drugs, which has lowered the price of medication by at least 79 percent. 60 In
contrast, the Bayh-Dole Act and U.S. patent law, which take a "natural rights"
approach equating private property and the market with public policy, ignore
those left out of market transactions and exclude the consideration of ethical and
moral grounds in determining the proper content and scope of legal property
rights.' 6
1
Defining intellectual property rights as a goal rather than a means also en-
courages a narrowing of research agendas to emphasize commercial potential.
162
155. Access to Essential Medicines, supra note 66, at 10.
156. Id.
157. See Sell, supra note 153, at 497 (discussing the possibility of refraining the TRIPS trade
agreement as a public health issue).
158. Rosenberg, supra note 130.
159. Id.
160. Id. As Rosenberg notes, "Brazil's program almost certainly pays for itself. It has halved the
death rate from AIDS, prevented hundreds of thousands of new hospitalizations, cut the trans-
mission rate, helped to stabilize the epidemic and improved the overall state of public health in
Brazil." Id.
161. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act reinforces the problem of the production of"me too"
drugs by pharmaceutical corporations, adding to the multiplicity of drugs that
treat the same conditions or diseases in industrialized countries,"' while failing
to engage in R&D of drugs and medical procedures to treat diseases, such as re-
sistant strains of malaria and tuberculosis, sleeping sickness, and dengue fever,
affecting people in developing countries.'
64
Patenting and licensing of research results, regardless of whether the research
is publicly or privately funded, has particular global implications for developing
countries. TNCs, with the United States as their strongest ally, have successfully
defined intellectual property rights as "trade-related" issues subject to international
trade agreements. 165 WTO agreements include TRIPS, 6 which was created in
1994 as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade), with the goal of harmonizing national laws on intellectual property
rights. 167 Under TRIPS, signatories to GATT have agreed to enact national laws
that establish minimum substantive standards of intellectual property rights pro-
163. See 't Hoen,supra note 130, at 296-97 (discussing the concentration of R&D in industrialized
countries and the statistics demonstrating that "[ilnvestments in health-related R&D [tend] to
gravitate towards illnesses or symptoms that offer the greatest potential return on investment, re-
gardless of actual health needs."). In the United States, during the period of 1981-2000, "less than
five percent of the drugs introduced by the top twenty-five pharmaceutical companies were ther-
apeutic advances." Id. at 297. 't Hoen notes that "seventy percent [of the therapeutic advances]
were developed with government involvement." Id.; see also Access to Essential Medicines, supra
note 66, at 2.
164. 't Hoen, supra note 130, at 296-97. See also M~decins Sans Fronti res Access to Essential
Medicines Campaign and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group, Fatal Imbalance:
The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases 4, 8, 11 (2001), available at
http://www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatal.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (discussing the
failure of private pharmaceutical companies to adequately address either "neglected diseases"
[such as tuberculosis, and malaria] or "the most neglected diseases" [such as sleeping sickness,
dengue fever, and leishmaniasis] in developing countries, the failure of governments in industrial-
ized countries to provide adequate public funding directed to research on such diseases, and the
need for a new nonprofit initiative to develop medicines to treat such diseases).
165. See Sell, supra note 153, at 485-87.
166. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
167. See Sell, supra note 153, at 481-91; Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential
U.S. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of"Super-Terrorism,"
18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237, 251-52, 262-69 (2002). See generally Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in
Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. I NT'L L.
165 (2000) (discussing the lack of consensus among WTO members).
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tection, which include patent protection of pharmaceutical products, plant variet-
ies, and computer programs. 6 ' Developing countries were strongly pressured by
powerful countries, particularly the United States, to agree to TRIPS,69 leading
critics to define the TRIPS goal of "harmonizing" intellectual property rights laws
as requiring adoption of "US-style intellectual property laws."'7 By agreeing to
TRIPS, developing countries are seriously restricted in their access to essential
medicines, including AIDS drugs and other patented products. Without patent
protections, these countries could create generic drugs (or other products), using
technology and discoveries covered by the patents. Under TRIPS, however, they
will be limited by the twenty-year patent term in creating generic products,' 7' with
enormous financial impacts.'72 For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb sold the pat-
ented antiretroviral drug, d4T, for more than $1,600 per patient per year in South
Africa; the generic form of this drug was sold in South Africa for $55 per patient
per year." Pfizer sells the patented drug Fluconazole, for treating cryptococcal
meningitis, for $14-25 per daily dose; the daily dose of the generic form of this drug
costs seventy-five cents.' 74 The use ofgeneric drugs to treat AIDS in Brazil has low-
ered the price of medicines by an average of 79 percent. 7 5
168. Erin Donovan, Beans, Beans, the Patented Fruit: The Growing International Conflict over the
Ownership of Life, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 134-35 (2002); Srividhya Ragavan,
Can't We All Get Along? The Casefor a Workable Patent Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117, 126-28 (2003).
The Royal Society reports that "as of 1 January 2002, there were 144 Members of the WTO, ac-
counting for over 90% of the world's trade." KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN,supra note 66, at 3.
169. Sell,supra note 153, at 489,493,520; The Right to Good Ideas, ECONOMIST, June 23,2001, at 21.
The sources discuss the developing countries' resistance to TRIPS, but their eventual agreement
in the hope of greater access to markets in OECD member countries; however, these economic
commitments to the developing countries have not been fulfilled.
170. Lori Wallach, The Alphabet Soup of Globalization 4-5, available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/alphabetpdf.PDE
171. See Jonathan Michael Berger, Tripping Over Patents: AIDS, Access to Treatment and the Man-
ufacturing ofScarcity, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 157, 183 (2002) (discussing TRIPS Article 33, which re-
quires a minimum twenty year period of patent protection). See generally Martin J. Adelman &
Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 511 (1996) (analyzing the impact of TRIPS on the pharmaceutical
industry in India).
172. See 't Hoen,supra note 130, at 296.
173. Access to Essential Medicines, supra note 66, at v.
174. Sell, supra note 153, at 507. The lowest price of a 200mg pill of fluconazole is 29 cents, man-
ufactured by Cipla, an Indian generic firm; the highest price is from Pfizer in Guatemala at $29
per 2 0 0 mg pill. Access to Essential Medicines, supra note 66, at 1.
175. Rosenberg, supra note 130.
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Developing countries were able to negotiate for some concessions regarding
the required dates of compliance with TRIPS, creating transition periods for de-
veloping countries until 2005, and for least developed countries until 2006,176
with this latter date recently extended until 2016.117 Developing countries also
successfully negotiated the inclusion in TRIPS of some exceptions to the patent-
ing requirements. Article 31 of TRIPS permits any WTO member country to
issue compulsory licenses of patents to address national emergencies, enabling
governments to license patents to domestic businesses to manufacture low-cost
generic drugs in the face of national health crises, such as the AIDS epidemic, or
in response to other national emergencies, such as global terrorism.178 The com-
pulsory licensing exception is limited, however, to the manufacture of generic
products for domestic use, which imposes a hardship on member countries
without the infrastructure required to manufacture the generics. 79 This Article
31 restriction, thus, creates barriers to the ability of member countries to export
generic drugs to address the public health need in another country.8' In August
2003, a decision of the WTO General Council provided some flexibility in the
implementation of Article 31, enabling member countries to export pharmaceu-
tical products manufactured under a compulsory license to WTO member
countries that do not have the capacity to manufacture the drugs. 8' Article 30,
176. Avedissian,supra note 167, at 266-67. Prior to becoming "TRIPS-compliant," WTO mem-
bers without patent protections on pharmaceutical products can still manufacture and export
generic drugs to other countries. See id. at 262-64. The United States, however, has used
"TRIPS-plus" mechanisms, such as bilateral treaties, to pressure developing countries to become
TRIPS-compliant prior to the end of these transition periods. Sell, supra note 153, at 493,500.
177. See Tara Kowalski, International Patent Rights and Biotechnology: Should the United States Pro-
mote Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 41,56 (2002).
178. Avedissian,supra note 167, at 262-64. Compulsory licensing is allowed under Article 31 for
"antitrust violations, governmental use, and extremely urgent circumstances, including national
emergencies." Id. at 262.
179. Id. at 265-66.
180. Id. at 265-66; Sell, supra note 153, at 500.
181. Developing countries had succeeded in placing this issue on the WTO's agenda, with the
Doha Declaration of 2001, which instructed the WTO General Council to find a solution to the
problem of the inability of some countries to effectively use compulsory licensing due to a lack of
manufacturing infrastructure. See Avedissian, supra note 167, at 266 n. 150 (discussing the WTO's
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Fourth Ministerial Conference in
Doha, Qatar, para. 6 (adopted Nov. 14, 2001)). The 2003 General Council's decision responds to
the Doha Declaration by creating an interim waiver of the export restriction of Article 31, until
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which creates a "limited exception" to patenting requirements, may create an
opening for a public health exception that permits such generic drug exports
under compulsory licensing,182 although this remains a controversial interpreta-
tion. ' 3 Another controversial area concerns "parallel importing" of patented
drugs after they have been sold in another country, which may enable a member
country to import the drugs at a discounted price without the patent holder's
consent.184 Although TRIPS does not create any explicit restrictions on import-
ing goods, pharmaceutical companies argue that their patent rights are not ex-
hausted after the initial sale of the drug. 185
Even with these important exceptions to patenting requirements, signato-
ries to TRIPS could still be faced with litigation over patent infringements, in-
cluding complaints filed under the dispute resolution processes of the WTO. 86
Such disputes may concern disagreements over the scope of TRIPS exceptions,
as well as disagreements over whether a country has fulfilled the difficult condi-
the TRIPS agreement is amended. See WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Sept. 1, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/trips-e/implem-para6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); WTO, Doha Develop-
ment Agenda: Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres03_e/pr350-e.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005);
Jennifer May Rogers, The TRIPS Council's Solution to the Paragraph 6 Problem: Toward Compul-
sory Licensing Viability for Developing Countries, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 443, 457-61 (2004).
182. Avedissian,supra note 167, at 267-69. Article 30 states, "[WTO] Members may provide lim-
ited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 166.
183. See Avedissian, supra note 167, at 267-69, 285 (noting that "developed countries are more
likely to oppose the use of [Article 301 as the basis for permitting compulsory licensing for ex-
ports"); see also Sell, supra note 153, at 517-18 (discussing the action of European and American
negotiators to block agreement, in the WTO Doha Declaration of 2001, that Article 30 could be
used to justify generic drug exports as part of compulsory licensing under TRIPS).
184. Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1,37-38 (2001); Allison Cychosz, The Effectiveness ofInternational Enforce-
ment of Intellectual Property Rights, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 985, 999-1000 (2004).
185. Correa,supra note 184, at 39-41.
186. See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role ofthe WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agree-
ment, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 824 (2003) ("Dispute resolution in the WTO is unlikely to yield
outcomes that disturb the strong presumption of protection for owners in a global marketplace.");
Sell,supra note 15 3, at 492-94.
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tions to qualify for use of compulsory licenses. 7 The United States has filed
more WTO TRIPS complaints than all other member countries combined.'
Developing countries have also faced pressure from governments attempting to
discourage their use of compulsory licensing and generic drug manufacturing.
The United States has used its economic power to threaten trade sanctions or
WTO complaints against Thailand,'89 Brazil, 9 ° and South Africa' 9' for their
manufacture of generic versions of patented AIDS drugs. In response to such
pressure, Thailand decided against compulsory licensing.'92 It was only after
well publicized political pressure from public interest groups in the "Campaign
for Access to Essential Medicines"' 93 that the United States withdrew its threat-
ened sanctions and complaints against Brazil and South Africa. 94
III. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF
ACADEMIC RESEARCH: FACULTY CHOICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Faculty cannot separate themselves from law and public policy, nor can they
convincingly pretend that their work and their work process do not have social
implications. Faculty choices about the content of their work and the nature of
their work process are shaped in important ways by the values and norms ex-
187. See Okedjii, supra note 186, at 903-13 (discussing the use of the WTO dispute resolution
process in a dispute involving the interpretation and application of TRIPS Article 30 and compul-
sory licensing); Berger, supra note 171, at 183-84 (discussing the use of the WTO dispute resolu-
tion process to address the meaning of the term "exceptions" under TRIPS).
188. Sell, supra note 153, at 492 (discussing the U.S. aggressiveness in filing fifteen complaints).
189. Id. at 500-01. In 1997 and 1998, the United States threatened trade sanctions against Thai
exports in retaliation against Thailand's plan to produce a generic version of an AIDS drug. Id. at
500.
190. Id. at 495-96 (discussing U.S. trade sanctions against both Argentina and Brazil and the
U.S. WTO complaint against Brazil's law permitting compulsory licensing).
191. Id. at 500-04 (discussing the U.S. pressure upon South Africa, based on the South African
Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act, that provided for compulsory licens-
ing and parallel importing of patented AIDS drugs).
192. Id. at 500.
193. Public interest organizations in the campaign include M~decins Sans Fronti~res, the Con-
sumer Project on Technology, ACT UP, and Oxfam UK. Id. at 495-99, 502, 506-07, 510.
194. See id. at 495-96, 501-04. Developing countries' plans to issue compulsory licenses and the
activism by the "Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines" have also helped motivate the large
pharmaceutical corporations to avoid the impact of generic drug pricing by discounting the prices
of AIDS drugs in developing countries. See Rosenberg,supra note 130; Sell,supra note 153, at 495,
510-13.
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pressed in the law.'95 The national policy enacted in the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, fa-
voring privatization and commercialization of intellectual property, has led to
major changes in the relationship between the university and the market and, as
a result, has changed the relationship between the university and the public.
Faculty are directly implicated in these changed social relations. By engaging in
the patent application process throughout the world, by sharing in the commer-
cial profits of marketing the patents, by acting simultaneously as academics and
private entrepreneurs, and by entering close relationships with industry, faculty
promote private market interests-their own, the university's, and industry's.
Further, through their exclusive licensing agreements with for-profit corpora-
tions, universities assist for-profit corporations to use academic research to de-
velop products marketed at monopoly prices. The social implications of these
actions have global reverberations, particularly severe for developing countries
under TRIPS, as patents and exclusive licenses apply to both basic and applied
research, including upstream research tools and medicines essential to treating
life-threatening diseases such as AIDS. The global effects apply to academic re-
search in Europe as well, where patents and licenses are increasing and where
industry has sought to change European patent law to reflect the broad defini-
tion of patentable subject matter used in U.S. law.'96
Given the close interaction between law and the social role of the university,
therefore, faculty should directly address the social implications of their work.
This active engagement with public policy has roots in the 1915 founding of the
AAUP, where faculty directly confronted the social role of faculty and the uni-
versity.'97 In their demands for academic freedom, faculty emphasized the im-
portance of the university's public interest mission and the essential nature of
faculty autonomy and independence in fulfilling this public mission. Current so-
cial and economic conditions make it as important for today's faculty to directly
address the societal mission of the university and the faculty's work within the
195. See Susan S. Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Architecture of Authority: The Place of Law in the
Space of Science, in THE PLACE OF LAw 75, 78 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2003) (discussing, in the con-
text of the creation of university science laboratories, the way "that law and science collaborate in
a mutual constitution whereby each is transformed, and the authority of each is preserved and ex-
tended."). The authors continue: "The interaction between law and science ends up recreating the
world, not only materially but also culturally and morally." Id.
196. KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN, supra note 66, at 7 (predicting that European law will not be
changed in "the foreseeable future" to conform to U.S. patent law).
197. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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university. This means that faculty, in the current context of privatization,
should engage in debates about the changes in public policy that affect their
work-including national laws such as the Bayh-Dole Act and multilateral
trade agreements such as TRIPS. Such debates should address the university
and faculty practices resulting from changes in public policy, including the ef-
fects of privatizing academic research through patenting and licensing and of
closer university-industry relationships. These discussions should confront hon-
estly the impact of privatization in multiple contexts: the changes in academic
values, culture, and practice within the university; the impact of commercializa-
tion on the public interest; and the global effects of providing exclusive licenses
to TNCs to use university-owned patents.
It is possible that these debates could result in endorsement by most faculty
of the privatization and commercialization of academic research. It seems more
likely, though, that full discussion of the issues will reinforce the fundamental
importance of the university's public mission and faculty academic freedom,
both of which are based on autonomy and independence from conflicting inter-
ests. If faculty find that privatization, implemented through the Bayh-Dole Act,
SCAs, and TRIPS, threatens academic values, then they should act individually
and collectively to oppose these measures.
Even in the current era of privatization and commercialization, individual
faculty exercise a great deal of control over their research process and content,
which includes choices about publication and patenting. Early faculty resistance
to patenting as inconsistent with the traditional open culture of academic re-
search can provide continued inspiration,198 including some well-known ex-
amples of faculty resistance to applying for patents. When asked who owned his
polio vaccine, Dr. Jonas E. Salk is quoted as replying, "Well, the people, I would
say. There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?"'" Scientists Cesar Milstein
and Georges Kohler decided not to patent their Nobel prize-winning invention
198. KENNEY, supra note 40, at 32 (describing the "ideology... of scientists working for the public
good" leading to the view that "industry's motives-especially that of profitability-were suspect,
and the applied science orientation of industry was considered to be scientifically uninspiring to
scientists").
199. Birch & Cohn, supra note 102. Dr. Salk was apparently later influenced by the commercial
biomedical explosion of the 1980s, for he applied for 7 patents on his therapeutic AIDS vaccine,
Remune, and helped found a biotechnology company to develop it. Id.; see also Symposium, The
Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The American Legal System's Response to Break-
throughs in Genetic Science, Panel One: Intellectual Property and Genetic Science: The Legal Dilem-
mas, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 371,377 (2002).
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of monoclonal antibody-producing hybridoma cells and requested that recipi-
ents of the cell line also not patent it.2"' Professors Stanley Cohen and Herbert
Boyer are reported to have initially resisted Stanford University's pressure to
patent their 1973 groundbreaking invention of the Cohen-Boyer rDNA gene-
splicing technique, based on their concern about patenting basic research that
had been built upon the prior research of other scientists." They agreed to apply
for the patent, jointly owned by Stanford and University of California, but re-
quired that the university engage in non-exclusive licensing, with royalties
going only to the university." 2 Individual faculty continue to play a role in uni-
versity decisions concerning patenting, as demonstrated by Yale University
Pharmacology Professor William Prusoff's support of the Yale students' cam-
paign to lower the cost of the AIDS drug d4T in South Africa. ° 3 Yale owns the
patent on d4T, which was developed by Professors Prusoff and Tai-shun Lin.
204
Prusoff called for Yale University and its exclusive licensee Bristol-Myers
Squibb to either waive their patenting and licensing rights and permit generic
drug manufacturing or to supply the drug for free.2"' Individual faculty also
have a role to play in public policy deliberations,20 6 including expert testimony
before congressional committees concerning the impact of patents and licensing
on academic research.
20 7
Given the strength of the trends toward commercialization of academic re-
search, however, it will be difficult for faculty to have a sufficiently effective im-
200. Rai,supra note 12, at 94; Eisenberg, supra note 12, at n.8; KENNEY, supra note 40, at 129.
201. Rai,supra note 12, at 93-94; Dueker,supra note 41, at 493-94. Boyer did subsequently pursue
commercial interests in 1976, as co-founder of the biotechnology company, Genentech, leading to
his multi-millionaire status as a stockholder in the company. Krimsky,supra note 53, at 19.
202. Rai,supra note 12, at 93.
203. See Sell, supra note 153, at 511-12; Donald G. McNeil Jr., Yale Pressed to Help Cut Drug Costs
in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at A3. M~decins Sans Fronti~res had initially asked Yale to
waive its patent on d4T. Id.
204. McNeil,supra note 203; Sell,supra note 153, at 511.
205. Sell,supra note 153, at 511-12; McNeil,supra note 203; Abigail Zuger, A Molecular Offspring,
Off toJoin the AIDS Wars, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at F7.
206. See 't Hoen,supra note 130, at 299-300 (describing a proposal by John Barton, Stanford Uni-
versity Professor of Law and Chair of the U.K. Commission in Intellectual Property Rights, for "a
treaty to preserve the global scientific and technology commons.").
207. See, e.g., KENNEY, supra note 40, at 84-85 (indicating that testimony was given at congres-
sional hearings held in 1981).
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pact solely through individual choices and actions.2"' Similar to their forebears in
the early twentieth century, faculty in the early twenty-first century need collec-
tive action to protect their independence and autonomy. Such collective actions
would reassert academic freedom as central to faculty identity, including main-
taining independence from industry and contributing to the public interest.
Even though legal issues such as intellectual property rights under the Bayh-
Dole Act and TRIPS may seem to be outside the expertise of most faculty, the
values and policies underlying these legal matters so fundamentally affect fac-
ulty work, that it is essential to address them. Further, there are many collective
actions that faculty can take to promote models of law and public policy that are
consistent with values of academic freedom and the university's public mission.
These actions can be done by faculty promoting changes in public policy and
law, supporting changes in internal policy of their own universities, and forming
alliances across universities.
In the sphere of governmental policy, faculty can provide collective support
for their universities to lobby for changes in law and federal agency regulations
that expand the public domain of research. Such reform efforts may range from
full repeal of the Bayh-Dole Act to more specific reforms that significantly ex-
pand the public domain by amending the Bayh-Dole Act to strengthen the
power of federal agencies to require public dissemination of federally funded
basic research; 209 to increase federal agencies' power to withhold title from gov-
ernment contractors or to require government contractors to issue nonexclusive
licenses for use of their federally funded patents; 21 1 or to give federal agencies the
208. See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Re-
search, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145, 157-59 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the difficulty of individual academic scientists adhering to the
"community norm of nonproprietary open access" when their colleagues are engaged in patenting
activities).
209. See Rai, supra note 12, at 148; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 59. In 1996, the National
Human Genome Research Institute and the NIH announced this condition for large-scale human
sequencing grants and, subsequently, for grants for research on single nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs). Rai,supra note 12, at 147-48.
210. See Rai,supra note 12, at 151; Access to Essential Medicines,supra note 66, at 6 (discussing the
NIH's efforts to broaden access to NIH-funded research through licensing provisions that call for
nonexclusive licensing, reduced royalties for sales of drugs in developing countries, and licensee
actions that benefit the public sector); Arno & Davis, supra note 69 (proposing enforcement of gov-
ernmental "march-in" rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to impose price controls on drugs devel-
oped fully or in part with federal funds).
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power to require government contractors to share basic research tools with each
other.21' Accompanying these efforts to promote legislative reform, universities
can lobby for increased public funds for research and development of advances
in science and medicine, rather than relying only on for-profit corporate re-
search and development to capitalize on academic research. Faculty could di-
rectly support such reform measures by testifying before congressional
committees concerning the need to amend the Bayh-Dole Act, describing the
conflict between the university's public mission and private economic interests,
the negative impact on the communal culture of patenting and licensing, and the
harm to academic research by restricting the public domain.
Faculty can also act collectively within their own universities to promote in-
ternal policies that limit the use of patents and exclusive licensing, emphasizing
the importance for faculty and universities to choose policies and practices that
promote the public interest. Given the tactical difficulty of persuading the uni-
versity and many faculty of the need to cease all patents and exclusive licenses, it
may be most feasible to identify specific areas where patents and exclusive licens-
ing are inconsistent with the universities' public mission and with the values of
autonomy and independence underlying academic freedom. Arguments against
patenting and licensing of such research can rely, as well, on the particular ethi-
cal and moral problems of patenting life forms or of limiting access by the poor,
in the United States and in other countries, to medicines. For example, faculty
could collectively support university policies that prohibit patenting or exclusive
licensing of upstream research212 or of essential medicines, such as the Harvard
and Stanford policies against patenting the gene fragments known as ESTs and
SNPs2i 3 and Yale University's decision to waive its patent rights on the AIDS
medicine d4T in South Africa. 14 Faculty can also act collectively to pressure the
university to condition its acceptance of corporate funding on provisions that in-
211. Rai, supra note 12, at 113, 150-51; Mikhail, supra note 50, at 392-93 (citing NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON RE-
SEARCH TOOLS (1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm).
212. See BoK,supra note 60, at 142 (proposing, in the context of curbing excesses under the Bayh-
Dole Act, that "universities ... agree not to use exclusive licenses or other restrictions on the shar-
ing of early-stage discoveries with other researchers").
213. Rai, supra note 12, at 112-13. Expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) are basic genetic research material. Id. at 104-05.
214. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
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crease faculty independence from corporate influence over their research agen-
das and that decrease the use of exclusive licensing agreements.
These collective actions will be more powerful if done by faculty forming al-
liances across universities. At the very least, faculty can share information about
policies that restrict patenting and licensing in their universities, which can then
be used as models in other universities. One example of an important alliance
with global effects is "Universities Allied for Essential Medicines" (UAEM),
which links universities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada,
to support faculty and student efforts to place pressure on the universities to
waive their patent rights on AIDS medicines in developing countries. 215 To be
effective, such waivers must include both the university's waiver as patent owner
and a waiver of rights by the exclusive corporate licensee. As a result of such a
campaign, Yale University and its exclusive licensee, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
waived their patent and licensing rights on the AIDS drug d4T in South Africa
and Bristol-Myers Squibb decided to cut the price of d4T in South Africa to
$0.15 for a daily dose, which is 1.5% of the price in the United States.216 As part
of the broader access to the essential medicines campaign, UAEM has played an
important role in re-focusing attention onto the institutional mission of univer-
sities to serve the public interest.
2II
CONCLUSION
The politics of privatization have made their mark on the university, thrust-
ing academic work directly into the controversies of globalization. With the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, universities were encouraged to become market actors,
patenting the results of federally funded research and licensing those patents to
industry. These increased university-industry interactions were accompanied by
215. See Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, at http://www.essentialmedicines.org/
about.html. Consider KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN, supra note 66, as an example of a report and recom-
mendations by the Royal Society in the United Kingdom on issues such as limiting the scope of
patents and increasing the use of compulsory licensing, which can form the basis for alliances
among universities in different countries.
216. Sell,supra note 153, at 511-12; Zuger, supra note 205.
217. See Sell, supra note 153, at 495-97, 511-12 (discussing the success of the Access to Essential
Medicines campaign, including the Yale University campaign, in responding to TRIPS with ac-
tions that "presented an alternative framing of [intellectual property] as a public health issue, not
a trade issue." Id. at 497.); Access to Essential Medicines, supra note 66, at iii-v, 2-4.
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a growing trend of private corporate funding to universities conditioned on in-
creased corporate control over distribution of funds and exclusive licenses on re-
sulting university-owned patents. The university's identity as market actor was
eased and reinforced by two additional developments in science and in politics.
The discoveries of genetic engineering in the mid-1970s opened the door to
commercialization of the new biomedical field of research, with the ability to
imagine the applications of basic research at an earlier stage than ever before. In
tandem with the biotechnology revolution, the Supreme Court laid the ground-
work for the proliferation of patents in the life sciences, with the 1980 Chakra-
barty decision, holding that "human-made" life forms can be patented.218 On the
heels of the Supreme Court's decision, the newly created Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals launched its pro-patent jurisprudence, creating fertile ground for
patents on the new discoveries in genetics and biotechnology, including patents
on basic research tools.
University privatization and commercialization have had negative conse-
quences for academic culture and the public interest. The basic principles of ac-
ademic freedom, which depend on faculty autonomy and independence from
conflicting interests, have been compromised by the consideration of the com-
mercial potential of academic research. Faculty relations and research agendas
have been affected by commercial interests and corporate involvement in re-
search. Patents and exclusive licenses have restricted the public domain, harm-
ing academic work and the public interest by creating impediments on further
research and enabling corporate licensees to engage in monopoly pricing. The
university's institutional legitimacy and the faculty's role in furthering the uni-
versity's public mission have been undermined by the conflict of interests cre-
ated by the multiple university-industry and faculty-industry economic
relations. The interweaving of university, faculty, and corporate interests has
broad effects as the patenting and licensing of academic research enters national
and international markets. The global impact of patents and exclusive licensing
of academic research has been amplified by multilateral agreements, such as
TRIPS, which support transnational corporate interests by imposing and en-
forcing legal standards of intellectual property rights on WTO members, in-
cluding developing countries.
218. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 305, 309-10 (1980).
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In the face of these economic and social developments, faculty have impor-
tant choices about their work and their identity. The strong professional norms
of academic freedom continue to provide a solid foundation for individual and
collective actions by faculty to oppose privatization and commercialization of
the university. Individual faculty autonomy over research agendas, research pro-
cess, and publication presents faculty with opportunities to seek broad public
dissemination of their research methods and results and to resist pressures to
patent their research results. Collective actions by faculty will also be essential
given the current force of privatization and commercialization trends. In their
own universities and through alliances across universities, faculty can collec-
tively shape university policies and practices that further public interest goals,
including university policies limiting the research that will be patented or exclu-
sively licensed and university waivers of their existing patent rights. Faculty can
also support university efforts to seek legislative reform that returns publicly
funded research to the public domain. Through such actions, faculty recognize
the social implications of their academic work and their individual and collec-
tive power to shape public policy and university practice.
